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Abstract
In this paper we revisit fundamentals of modeling and discuss the notions of models, representations,
validation and veriﬁcation, and many other basic concepts. We argue that the key notions about model
and simulation quality, i.e. of what constitites valid simulations, can be understood and also classiﬁed
using the simple concept of comparison. To arrive at this conclusion, we ﬁrst discuss our basic under-
standing of modeling and that of the simulation process. Throughout the paper we will discuss issues
related to computer simulation in full generality, but occasionally we will also refer to particular points
concerning our own domain of work, agent-based simulations.
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1 Introduction
Computer simulation has a long history in many disciplines in natural science, and recently it is gaining
focus in various ﬁelds of computational science [2, 12] and social sciences [7, 6] as well. Naturally,
and quite desirably, this is accompanied by a renewed interest in the methodology of computational
modeling in general, and a discussion about what constitutes valid and accepted results of modeling
in particular [8]. This debate is important, because the apparent differences in the way of thinking
(or ”modes of thought”) of the natural, engineering and social sciences makes it sometimes difﬁcult to
simply import the validity concepts used in one disciplines to another, even if relying on disciplines with
a long history of computer simulation.
In this paper we argue that the key concepts about valid simulations can be understood and also
classiﬁed using the simple concept of comparison. To arrive at this conclusion, we ﬁrst discuss our
basic understanding of modeling and that of the simulation process. Throughout the paper we will
discuss issues related to computer simulation in full generality, but occasionally we will also refer to
particular points concerning our own domain of work, agent-based simulations [10].
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Figure 1: ”This is not a pipe.” The Treachery Of Images (La trahison des images, Ren Magritte, 1928-
1929). Source: http://collections.lacma.org/node/23957.
2 The Model is (Not) A Pipe
We start with simple observations. In order to illuminate our understanding of what constitutes a model,
we borrow a well-known metaphor from Prof. Peter Allen of Cranﬁeld University, who uses the famous
painting by Rene´ Magritte on Figure 1 to explain his students the essentials of modeling, cf. also [13]
p11. The painting shows a realistic image of a pipe, plus the warning that this is not a pipe. Now, the
warning is right of course, as you can never use the depicted object to have a good smoke after dinner.
You cannot even grasp it for that matter, as it is lacking one dimension out of the three of everyday
objects. Yet, the image is a realistic one so we can imagine that it could be used to explain to someone
from another culture what a pipe looks like and what parts it consists of, etc. It may even be possible to
explain using it how to make a good pipe and what are the difﬁculties to avoid.
This is very similar to the case of modeling indeed, where the single key component of a model
is simpliﬁcation [1]. There is little point in creating a model if it has all the complexity of the object
it is modeled after. The best model of every system is itself [4]. And that is another point; there is
always a duplicity involved, that of the model (the image) and the target modeled after (the pipe). More
importantly, the model has to be useful in one way or the other (explaining what a pipe is like or how
to make one), or otherwise, again, there would be little point in creating the model in the ﬁrst place.
However, quite clearly, there are many possible uses and many possible simpliﬁcations that we can
think of, so there are always an endless number of (good, i.e. functionally adequate) models of the same
target.
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2.1 The Many Models of a Single Computer Simulation
We go one step further. In addition to the many possible (and adequate) models of the same natural
target, there are always many models connected to the same computer simulation as well. This is not
simply a consequence of the iterative nature of research that produces newer and newer insights and
hence improved models, albeit this property indirectly multiplies the number of models involved. More
importantly however, a single computer simulation also inherently involves many different models.
Let us count them. A ﬁrst model of the target is built in the brain of the modeler - this we will call the
modeler’s cognitive model of the target system. This is then formalized using human language, creating
an (oral or written) speciﬁcation delivered to the programmer involved1.
The programmer then builds his/her own cognitive model, in turn, from which another formal rep-
resentation, namely an implementation is created. Finally, the simulation is eventually executed and the
work published. For the latter, a formal model description is usually created, which is again different.
The publication also tends to contain the results of the simulation together with their interpretation.
The importance of this plurality of models (representations) connected to a single computer simu-
lation is manifold. First, this is an obvious source of error and misunderstanding, especially if several
persons are involved. Often we see this when modelers and programmers enter discussion.
In addition (which is more important for our present paper), the quality of the simulation work and
its results are greatly affected by the possible and to some extent inevitable discrepancies between the
cognitive model, the implementation and ﬁnally, the published formal model description, which are the
steps of the process. The issue is obviously connected with model veriﬁcation and validation, and we
will come back to them later. The multiplicity of models brings up another issue, however, and this is
often raised by simulation skeptics.
Wouldn’t it be better, they ask, to leave out the whole programmer-implementation-formalization
(computational) part altogether, and do all the modeling using just good old fashioned and reliable
mathematics?
2.2 Computer Simulation as a Formal System
We do not want to re-iterate in detail the common claims in favor of computational modeling at this
point (e.g., the possible intractability of the models, the often unrealistic computational assumptions
about the actors, the inability to analyze non-equilibrium situations, etc.).
Rather, here we would like to point out that the entire question is wrong. At least, it is wrong when
contrasting the representational power of simulations to mathematics. That is because all computer
simulations are, by deﬁnition, formal mathematical models themselves. This should be obvious since all
computation that is performable by today’s computers can be equivalently calculated by an appropriately
constructed program on a general Turing machine. Since both the Turing machine and its program are
well-deﬁned mathematical constructs, there is no reason to think that computer simulations are less
formal than any other constructs of mathematics.
Since the reference to the Turing machine may seem rather vague, and Turing machines in general
are rather hard to work with, we offer another metaphor here, which may be more instructive: every
computer simulation can be equivalently described by an appropriately constructed Markov chain [9].
Omitting the formal details, a Markov chain is a discrete-time stochastic process with the property
that its future state only depends on its state at present (and not in the past) - in other words, the only
form in which the past connects to the future is via the current state. Therefore, since the computer is an
inherently discrete engine, all we need to prove to show a simulation is a Markov chain is to see that our
1Here we discuss the (rather typical) case when the modeler and the programmer are two different persons. Nonetheless, a
shorter, but very similar chain of models is constructed in the case of computer savvy modelers
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simulation is ”memory-less”. But this is trivially true, since a simulation’s future state can only depend
on the present state of the computer’s memory.
So - in an important sense, models, simulations and ”good old” mathematical structures are funda-
mentally equivalent. Then why use the one and not the other?
3 Representation Matters
It is because representation matters - it is (almost) everything. Hopefully, the general argument above
have convinced the reader that constructing a computational model is no less formal than using other
constructs from mathematics. Yet, there are subtle differences. One is because mathematical disciplines
and systems (like Functional Analysis, the Turing machine or the Markov process) come with their
inherent methods of solution and well-known theorems. What the simulation skeptics really lack when
asking for formalization is building on these methods and theorems. And the appropriate reason here is
indeed often intractability. However, we would also like to point to another, related point: practicality.
Figure 2: Representation (interpretation) matters. The picture of the Kiyumizudera in Kyoto - opened
in a text editor and in a picture viewer, respectively.
Computer simulations allow for the construction and analysis of models whose other formal equiv-
alents (even when constructed in less-naı¨ve ways than above) would be impractical to work with. This
importance of representation may be illuminated by another simple visual metaphor. The two panels
of Figure 2 show the very same picture, except that their representation (interpretation) is different. In
other words, the picture of the Kiyumizudera in Kyoto is the same, but on the left it is opened in a text
editor, while on the right in a picture viewer - just the rendering is different. The ﬁgure is meant to
clearly show that representation matters, and that some formalization may be egregiously easier to work
with in a speciﬁc problem setting than another. The latter remark is also applicable when discussing the
application of different simulation paradigms (e.g., agent-based versus systems dynamics simulations).
In other words, things that are equivalent are not. Equivalent in principle does not imply equivalent
in practice, in actual value. This is the point where simulations begin to be interesting, by offering the
kinds of representations we can seamlessly work with in the given problem context.
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4 Operations on Models as Comparisons
So far we have argued that there are multiple models of the same target, and a series of them is involved
in any computer simulation. Then we have argued that computer simulation is nothing but a speciﬁc
formalism to describe models as mathematically grounded as it gets. Yet a simulation may be a more
practical tool for handling certain problems than the analytical methods, just because its representation
is more amenable to the problem domain. In the following, we turn back to the quality of simulation.
The relevant literature on computer simulation, both in the natural and engineering sciences, and
about social simulation, contains several different concepts and approaches to deﬁne and assess the
quality of computational models. Among them are concepts of structural and phenomenological valid-
ity; veriﬁcation and validation [14], etc. In our view, all these can be understood within a very simple,
uniﬁed framework.
We maintain that the quality of a model is always determined by a comparison between two different
objects (models, systems, etc.). For example,
• validation checks the accuracy of the model’s representation of the real system. How that is pos-
sible is by comparison of elements of the model to observations on reality. (We note that, strictly
speaking, we thus compare models with more models; the set of observations or information set
constitutes namely an empirical model of the real system [11] - marked by the simpliﬁcations
necessary to observe one thing and not another.)
• veriﬁcation [5, 15] compares the implementation of the model to that of the speciﬁcation, or
implicitly, to the modeler’s cognitive model. Alternatively,
• in a replication of the model, we compare the results of one implementation to another, or more
precisely, the results (and interpretation) of the replica, to those in the original publication.
• simulation docking is a similar enterprise that compares the end results of two chains of models
of the same target.
More importantly, this comparison-based framework allows us to point out subtle differences among
different approaches and their motivations to computational modeling. The different approaches enjoy
a different status in the respective disciplines (i.e., engineering simulations versus artiﬁcial societies
simulations; the ﬁrst is well-received and standard and the second is considered controversial and exper-
imental). They usually have their widely accepted dominant ”modus operandi”, albeit some disciplines
allow for multiple approaches.
4.1 A Comparison-Based Taxononomy of Approaches to Model Quality
In the following we will present an incomplete taxonomy of the main approaches to model quality (See
Figure 3.)
Prediction. We start with prediction, which is also probably held as most common mark of validity. It
is certainly what agent-based modelers are most often forced to explain why they are not doing. In the
case of prediction, the source of validity is the agreement between the state of the implementation at a
future time (in simulated units) with that of the target at a future time (in real units)2. The requirement
of prediction is natural when the purpose of the simulation is to prevent something from happening
2Here we deliberately avoid discussing issues related to the availability of empirical data about the target, or about the
possible subjective interpretation and representation of that data. Issues connected to the possible theory (i.e., model) driven bias
in empirical data collection are also omitted.
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Name Comparison Example Domain of use
Prediction The state of the im-
plementation at time
t + T , to the state of
the target at a future
time
Hurricane warning
systems
Engineering, Natural
Sciences, Microsim-
ulation
Retrodiction The state of the im-
plementation at time
t − T , to the state of
the target at a previ-
ous time
Models of climate
change matched
to data from fossil
records
Climate modeling
Phenomenological
simulation
A speciﬁc property
of the implementa-
tion to a speciﬁc
property of the target
known a priori
Wright brother’s ﬂy-
ing machine, Turing
test, Flight and car
race simulations
Engineering
Thought experiments The results of
the simulation to
consequences of
pre-existing theories
/ models
Axelrod’s Evolu-
tion of Cooperation
model
Social simulation
Table 1: A(n incomplete) comparison-based taxonomy of different approaches to model quality.
(e.g., the collapse of a building) or to give an appropriate and reliable warning (e.g., hurricane warning
systems).
Retrodiction. Sometimes, the ability to predict is not an applicable measure of validity, even if the
simulation’s motivation and purpose can be seemingly very similar. That is the case, for example, in
climate change research, where the time-scale of the modeled phenomena rules out all meaningful tests
of the prediction capability. (By the time it can be decided whether a given model predicts a correct
picture of global warming, the window of opportunity for preventive action might well be closed.) In
the case of such applications, simulation quality is assessed through a comparison based on retrospective
ﬁtting, i.e., the states of the implementation at previous times (in simulated units) is compared to the
previous states of the target, and the hope is that if values in the past match, so will they in the future as
well.
Phenomenological simulation. A completely different approach to simulation quality is present in many
engineering applications, or in Artiﬁcial Intelligence. The well-known ”Turing test” [17] assumes that in
order to qualify for the title of ”intelligent agent”, an artiﬁcial chatter robot needs to be indistinguishable
by a human observer from human chatting partners. Drawing a surprising parallel, this is very similar
to the case of the early history of aviation. The Wright brothers wanted to build an object that simulates
a distinct property of birds: namely that of ﬂying. In their search to achieve this goal, they have built
a model of birds that mimicked very few properties of the actual birds, but reproduced the desired
phenomenon itself. This approach we can call phenomenological simulation and again the comparison
framework can explain it. A phenomenological simulation is one that compares a speciﬁc property of
the implementation to a speciﬁc property of the target known a priori.
Thought experiments. Finally, an approach very common in agent-based social simulation is what is
generally called a ”thought experiment” that creates existence proofs for highly theoretical questions.
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A prime example is Robert Axelrod’s Evolution of Cooperation model [3]. In this model, Axelrod
sets out to investigate an apparent contradiction present between the elementary assumption held by
many social scientists about the fundamentally selﬁsh nature of human behavior and the high degree
of altruistic behavior observed in everyday life. Axelrod concretizes this general question by studying
the evolution of strategies in an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) setting. His computational model
shows that it is not impossible for cooperative (altruistic) behavior to emerge and to dominate societies.
That is, when assessing the quality of the model, Axelrod compares the results of his simulations to
consequences of pre-existing theories/models.
5 Discussion
We suggest that most known computational models can be reformulated in the above way. Sometimes
the reformulation has a surprising effect: it may reveal that the actual question answered by the model
might not have an utter importance after all. This paradoxical consequence is because an honest for-
mulation of this kind should list, for the comparison framework to function at all, the ceteris paribus
assumptions of the model, which narrows down its applicability.
For example, Thomas Schelling’s all-famous segregation model [16] sets out to answer a general
theoretical question whether massive residential ethnic segregation is possible in a rather tolerant society
(i.e., in a society where every individual is very tolerant towards members of different ethnicity). A
different way to formulate the same question is whether intolerance (racism) is necessarily at work when
we observe segregation. But to make the formulation more precise, we need to include the assumption
of a discrete, two-dimensional space in the model; a step-like tolerance function, etc. Introducing these
constraints, however, reformulates the question to a much less interesting, and more limited one about
the speciﬁc simulation only. (Clearly the 2-grid cannot directly say much about the original question.)
Yet, this phenomenon may also be seen as an advantage (especially, since computational models
help making assumptions rather explicit) as the systematic relaxation or change of the aforementioned
limitations (such as the sweeping of interaction topologies) may help determining the domain of appli-
cability of the model. Hence both the simulation framework and the comparison method can ultimately
contribute to transparent, documentable, reproducible research.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have re-visited basic notions of computational modeling, and introduced a simple,
comparison-based framework for describing various existing approaches to assess the validity of com-
puter simulations. We discussed four major directions in more detail: prediction, retrospective ﬁtting
or retrodiction, phenomenological simulation and thought experiments, respectively. Examples for the
application of these approaches were also provided.
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